This project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market. We consider a special "box design" market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices. We manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based one of two procedures. In the first, a subject's score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status; in another, subjects are assigned randomly to a higher-status or lower-status group. In both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher-status sellers face lowerstatus buyers, and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers. Across all sessions, the higher-status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus, earning significantly more than their lowerstatus counterparts.
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I. Introduction:
This paper reports laboratory experiments that examine the effects of status in a market setting. We find that status appears to have a significant effect on prices and earnings, even when the assignment of status is completely random, and can be seen to be random by the subjects involved. These results suggest that status may have an important effect on market outcomes in situations in which status has real meaning.
A person's status is a ranking in a hierarchy that is socially recognized and typically carries with it the expectation of entitlement to certain resources. There are many hierarchies within which a person might be ranked, from those based on specific skills or accomplishments that are only narrowly recognized, to more general societal rankings. In addition, different social groups may value hierarchies differently. Within a given social context, however, a person's status entitles them to certain privileges, and affects the way they interact with others.
1 Evidence of the value of status is the effort that is expended by people to attain status, a propensity noted by Adam Smith, 2 deplored by Veblen (1926) , and elaborated more recently by Frank and Cooke (1995) . The concern with relative ranking is pervasive in virtually all societies. (Gil-White and Henrich (2000) provide examples.)
Economists have investigated the effects of a preference for status. Becker's (1971) examination of discrimination begins with an assumption that people care about the characteristics of those with whom they interact. His negative effect of discrimination against 1 Sociologists study the way status differentials are formed and perpetuated in social interaction, but rarely use these concepts in incentivized environments or to study questions of interest to economists. See Webster and Foschi (1988) for a survey.
2 Adam Smith (1982) deplored expenditure for the sake of status (which he terms "place"):
And thus, place, that great object which divides the wives of aldermen, is the end of half the labours of human life; and is the cause of all the tumult and bustle, and the rapine and injustice, which avarice and ambition have introduced into this world. People of sense, indeed, despise place.... (p. 57) those with an undesirable characteristic can be reinterpreted as favoritism toward those with a desirable characteristic, or a preference for association with high-status persons. Perhaps more closely related to the present discussion is his theory of social interaction (Becker, 1974) . He develops a model of the production of professional distinction, which is essentially ranking in a specialized status hierarchy. Again, this model can be reinterpreted as the production of general social distinction, or social status. If status is desirable, individuals are willing to sacrifice consumption to obtain it.
Status is economically important because it affects the allocation of resources among individuals, and over time can affect the pattern and rate of economic growth in a society.
Research on status seeking has modeled the economic implications of the desire to win the status contest. See, for example, Robson (1992) , Ng and Wang (1993) , Congleton (1989), Fershtman and Weiss (1993) , and Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) . What is common about most of this work is that it concludes that status-seeking behavior diverts resources from productive use, and so is welfare-reducing relative to the outcome where individuals do not engage in this behavior. Cole, Mailath and Postelwaite (1992) develop a model for an economy in which some resources (mates) are allocated on the basis of a status ranking, rather than in the context of a market. They show that such a structure can lead to a correlation between status and income, and that different allocation rules can substantially affect the growth rate of an economy.
We investigate the effect of a status differential on the allocation of resources in a laboratory market experiment. We induce a difference in ranking between two groups of subjects. Group members then participate in an auction market with a box design, where a vertical overlap in supply and demand yields multiple equilibria. Members of the higher-status group are assigned to one side of the market (buyers or sellers) facing members of the other group on the other side. We find that, on average, prices are higher in markets where higherstatus sellers face lower-status buyers, and lower when the buyers have higher status than sellers.
Across all sessions, the higher-status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus, earning significantly more than their lower-status counterparts.
II. Status and Exchange
In this section we motivate our hypothesis in a very simple model in which status affects market outcomes. 3 We assume throughout that the numeraire good can be consumed in negative amounts or that individual endowments of the numeraire good are sufficiently large that the non-negativity constraint never binds.
where ε i ≥0 may be individual specific. 
Since buyers have higher status than sellers, the status term for buyers is negative, so the highest price at which i is willing to buy in this market is lower than the highest price at which i would be willing to buy in the absence of status. Similarly, seller j will be willing to sell one unit of the divisible good at the price p exactly when p -r s + ε j ⋅(σ b -σ s ) ≤ 0;
equivalently, when r s -ε j ⋅(σ b -σ s ) ≤ p. Since buyers have higher status than sellers, the status term for sellers is positive, and minus the status term is negative; the lowest price at which j is willing to sell in this market is lower than the lowest price at which j would be willing to sell in ', r b '] . 4 Thus the whole range of equilibrium prices shifts down. See Figure 1 .
Similarly, when the sellers have uniformly higher status than buyers the whole range of equilibrium prices shifts up.
These results lead us to our experimental hypothesis:
Hypothesis: In markets where sellers have higher status, the distribution of equilibrium prices will be higher than in markets where buyers have higher status.
III. Status in a Laboratory Market a. Box-Design Market Institution
We choose the box design market to test for status effects for two reasons. First, its multiple-equilibria provide scope for status to affect the market price, even under a highly competitive market institution like the Oral Double Auction (ODA). Second, the market context allows both a degree of anonymity and competition as compared with simple bargaining games such as the ultimatum game. Hoffman, et al, 1996) . We expect that status will not matter in the former cases and will matter significantly in the latter cases.
While the sensitivity of two-person bargaining games makes them attractive for testing the effects of status, the same sensitivity means that individual idiosyncrasies can introduce a considerable amount of noise into the results (as in Eckel, 1996, 1998) . For this reason we utilize a hybrid institution with characteristics of both institutional extremes: the box-design market. The range of equilibria in the box-design market introduces scope for social factors such as status to influence the market outcome by affecting which equilibrium is selected. However, the ODA mechanism induces market competition among agents that disciplines the traders and narrows the range of trading prices. This diminishes the role that a single idiosyncratic trader can have on the market, and allows us to assess the aggregate effect of status differentials between buyers and sellers.
b. Experimental Design and Procedure
Allocating Status
not too large. 5 Market forces induce the participants to behave rationally: in fact, even "zero intelligence traders" appear to behave like economic man under this institution (Gode and Sunder, 1992) .
In designing our experiments we made the decision to induce a status differential instead of using naturally-occurring status differences among subjects. Our reluctance to use obvious status differences such as socio-economic status, race, sex, athletic ability or academic rank arose from a fear that subjects might not agree about what constituted high status. For example, some students might view members of the football team as higher-status, but others might be indifferent to athletic ability or might look down on athletes because of inferior academic performance. Inducing status differences gives subjects a common experience, diminishing the chance that there would be disagreement about who had higher status.
The procedure we developed arose from our interest in a study where elementary school teacher Jane Elliott induced surprisingly severe discrimination among third-graders. Her procedure created (then reversed) a status hierarchy based on the children's eye color. 6 To effect a similar status difference, we adapted a procedure developed by psychologists to form groups, adding a status differential to the procedure (Turner and Brown, 1978) . Status is allocated through two variations on the procedure that we term awarded and random status. In both, status is in fact allocated randomly, although one variation is designed to suggest to the subjects that the high status was deserved. Awarded status involves a minor deception of the subjects that meets American Psychological Association guidelines (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code.html) and is of a degree common in other social science experiments. Random status is quite transparent to subjects and involves no deception.
While we appear to go to great lengths to convince subjects of a status difference, we believe the manipulation to be rather weak. This is borne out by the analysis of the postexperiment questionnaire data, presented in section IV below.
Awarded Status: A quiz is administered to subjects, which consists of five obscure economics questions with numerical answers. (See appendix for a copy of the quiz). Subjects are told to fill in an answer for each question, even if guessing is necessary. The quizzes are collected and taken out of the room for scoring. To score the quizzes we simply add up the answers to the questions for each subject. Subjects are not told the method by which the quizzes are scored. This scoring method is used as a way of effectively randomizing subject assignment to high and low-status groups.
Once the quizzes are scored, we hold a ceremony where status is awarded to half of the group. The experimenter calls out the names of the high-status group one at a time, and each member of the group is awarded a gold star. Once all names are called, the experimenters encourage the subjects who did not receive gold stars to applaud the group that did. In some sessions, subjects with low scores receive high status; in others, subjects with high scores receive high status. This is done to ensure that the quiz is not selecting subjects for one group or the other in any systematic way. For example, if more intelligent subjects are chosen to receive stars, then that difference alone could affect the price, producing a spurious effect.
At this point the subjects are seated in separate areas of the room --all those with stars on one side of the room, and those without stars on the other side --such that no subject can observe another's information. Subjects are informed that the group with stars will be either the buyers or the sellers in the market, with the other group of subjects taking the other side. Folders are distributed to all subjects containing cost and reservation values, and the instructions and record sheets for the experiment. The higher-status subjects have stars on themselves, their bidding cards, and the folders. Until the auction begins, the high-status group is treated with a greater respect and consideration by the experimenters; for example, they are called on first during the instruction phase if they have questions. This special treatment is scripted, as indicated in the protocol in the appendix. Once the auction begins, all subjects are treated equally, as explained below.
Random Status. In a second procedure, status is allocated randomly. As subjects enter the room, each is asked to write his/her name on a slip of paper and drop it into a basket. Half of the slips are drawn in the presence of all participants, and these subjects become the high-status players. Subjects observe this procedure, and so are clearly aware that status is allocated randomly. Since it is now transparent that the gold stars are absolutely meaningless, we hypothesized that this treatment would lessen or eliminate the effect of status. The rest of the procedure is unchanged, including the awards ceremony, which is conducted exactly as in the previous treatment. Troyer and Younts, 7 Note that this procedure does not frame the allocation of status in the experiment in a way that suggests entitlement to the role of buyer or seller. The status procedure precedes the allocation of roles in the market. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and others have shown that entitlement to a role makes agents more likely to behave in a way that maximizes their own payoff, reducing the tendency to equal-splitting in simple bargaining games. In Ball and Eckel (1996) we report data from ultimatum games, where subjects with and without status are matched in all possible 1997.) In the context of our experimental design, the stars become a status characteristic. We can be reasonably confident that our procedure induces differential expectations states between groups of subjects. Our experiments show that an induced status characteristic can affect earnings, not just in a group decision-making environment, but in a competitive market. showing up and are told that they will earn additional amounts that depend upon their decisions during the two-hour experiment.
pairings. Here the connection between status and the role in the game is clearly separated. The results are similar to those here, with higher-status players earning more on average. 8 Questions sometimes arise as to whether our result is due to "experimenter demand". As Davis and Holt (p. 26) warn, "Experiments should be conducted in such a manner that does not lead participants to perceive any particular behavioral pattern as being correct or expected, unless explicit suggestion is a treatment variable."(italics added). We make three points in this regard. First, the status procedure is a treatment variable, and the suggestion that some subjects are rank higher than others comes explicitly from the experimenters. It is designed to lead subjects to believe that one group is superior to the other. Since the suggestion comes from the experimenters, it is in a sense due to a demand from the experimenter; but it is a deliberate manipulation, and not an accidental effect of what the experimenter wants the result to be, hence is not an experimenter demand effect in the usual sense. A second point is that the "blind" auctioneer (explained below) coupled with the competitive nature of the market makes it highly unlikely that experimenter demand affected the outcome of the auction itself. Finally, a debriefing questionnaire asked subjects to describe their thought process and strategy for participating in the auction. Not a single subject mentioned the star. 9 The odd number of sessions is due to one unpaired session, which occurred because of scheduling problems. Results are unchanged whether or not this session is included. It is not included in Figure 2 (for balance), but is included in the data analysis.
In the awarded-status treatment, participants are first given the quiz, and while the quiz is being scored general instructions for participation in a double oral auction are read (based on Davis and Holt, 1993) . In the random-status treatment, instructions for the double auction also are read prior to the awards ceremony. The experiments are not computerized because we believe that it is important for subjects to be able to see whether or not the others are wearing stars. After the stars are distributed subjects are told whether they will be buyer or sellers and are given their reservation values. All buyers in any given pair of sessions have the same reservation value; all sellers have the same cost. Subjects are seated so they cannot observe the reservation values or costs of other players. They only know their own value or cost. Each subject can trade up to two units per round. Sessions consist of one practice period for which subjects are not paid, and ten subsequent rounds with payment; earnings averaged $16.76 in addition to the show-up fee.
The cost and reservation values are changed for each pair of experiments by adding or subtracting a constant from all parameters, and are unknown to the auctioneer. This was done to make the auctioneer partially blind to the experimental treatment. The experimental protocol instructs the auctioneer to alternate between calling on a random bidder from the buyer side of the market and one from the seller side, only calling on the same side twice in a row if there are no bidders on the other side of the market. Four additional sessions were conducted with a slightly different protocol. Here buyers and sellers could "call out" prices in any order; the auctioneer did not alternate between buyers and sellers. 10 All other aspects of the protocol were identical.
10 Charles Plott, who was somewhat skeptical of the robustness of our results, suggested this treatment to us. He hypothesized that our results were sensitive to our auction procedure, which effectively "rationed" access to the market by calling on alternating sides of the market. Instructions in these markets were identical; only the behavior of the auctioneer was different. Results from these four sessions are not significantly different from the others, and
Following the experiments, a questionnaire is administered. We collect socio-economic data as well as some information about the experiment itself. Subjects are privately paid the amount they earn in the experiment.
IV. Results
A total of 204 subjects were recruited from introductory undergraduate courses in business, social sciences and statistics at Virginia Tech and at the University of Arizona.
Women constituted 39 percent of the subjects, 81 percent were Caucasian, 2/3 were freshmen and sophomores, and the average age was 20. Seventeen sessions were completed. Sixteen are paired sessions consisting of a buyer-status session and a seller-status session conducted with the same parameters (seller cost and buyer reservation value). Results of the 16 paired experimental sessions are reported in Figure 2 (the one unmatched session is dropped for balance). Tables 1-4 contain data for all 17 sessions. Summary results from the exit questionnaire are shown in Table   3 and the results are included in the data analysis below. all sessions were pooled for the analysis that follows. We collected data on the number of bids and asks in these markets. While there were slightly more bids and asks on average by players with stars, the difference was not statistically significant.
traded, but these units were truncated to keep the averages consistent. 11 Average prices in the buyer-status sessions are lower than in seller-status sessions. In addition, prices tend to fall below the midpoint of the surplus range in these experiments, consistent with the "weak seller"
effect that Smith and Williams (1990) report.
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We analyze the data at three levels of aggregation, with the unit of observation taken to be the session, the trading period, or the subject. At the most aggregate level, using the experimental session as the unit of observation (n=17), we find that the mean earnings for the high-status side of the market exceeds that for the low-status side of the market (t=2.72; p<.01).
The effect of awarded status is not significantly different from random status (t=0.32, p=.37).
Finally we can confirm the "weak seller" effect found by Smith and Williams, with buyers earning more on average than sellers (t=2.28, p<.01).
We next analyze the data using average price in a trading period as the unit of analysis (n=170). In Table 1 we report results from regression analysis that models the convergence process of the price path and the impact status has on this process. The average price in a trading period is standardized as a percent of surplus so that prices range from 0 to 100. We use this technique to examine the impact of the experimental treatments (status differentials and status allocation procedures) on the ending point of the price path.
13, 14
11 Since different parameters produce different focal points and convergence to different price levels within the surplus range, including incomplete averages is not appropriate in the figure. (The data analysis that follows includes all trades.) 12 There were slight differences in the patterns of convergence across the status allocation procedures (individual results not shown). For four of the five individual pairs of awarded-status sessions, price in the seller-status market converged to a higher level than the price in the seller-status; in one pair of sessions the pattern was reversed. In the random-status sessions, for all pairs the price in the seller-status marked reached a higher level than the buyer-status session. 13 As there is no reason to assume all experiments will exhibit similar convergence paths, the model is capable of permitting each experiment its own path. In the actual application of the model, however, data limitations require the assumption that experiments of like treatment have a common convergence path. 14 The model of convergence is suggested by Ashenfelter, et al, (1992) and employed by Noussair, et al., (1995) We now turn to the analysis of individual data. Table 2 gives summary data for the subjects by treatment and by sex. There are no significant socioeconomic differences between the subjects by treatment. Answers to the questionnaire show that people with stars thought the star players were more powerful, clever, aggressive, and deserving than those without stars.
Overall, there is no evidence that no-star subjects were aware of a status difference between themselves and the star players. Star subjects thought the procedure was fair and reflected ability; no-star subjects disagreed. Each group preferred their own to the other. Male and female subjects also do not differ systematically, except that women are less likely to be business y it = B 11 D 1 (1/t) + B 12 D 2 (1/t) + ... + B 1n D n (1/t) + B 2 ((t-1)/t) + u
The subscripts i and t denote the particular experiment and the particular period in the experiment, respectively. The dependent variable, y it , is the average percentage of the surplus captured by the seller in trading period t. The dummy variable D i takes a value of 1 for experiment i and 0 otherwise. The origin of the convergence process is given by B 1i . B 2 is the asymptote of experiment i's dependent variable. The estimates reported in Table 1 were corrected for first-order auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. The method of correction employed is Kmenta's majors. Few differences emerge in the questionnaire data, although women appear slightly more likely to accept the status manipulation. Table 3 contains regression results with the cumulated earnings of a subject as the dependent variable (n=204). The first six variables reported in Table 1 are dummy variables equal to 1 for the specified condition (e.g., Buyer is equal to 1 when the subject is a buyer.)
Model 1 shows that subjects with higher status earn 14.7 percent more of the surplus (about $.26
per trade) than subjects with lower status. We again observe a significant "weak seller" effect in the sense that buyers earn about 16 percent more than sellers do. In the absence of any status effects, this indicates that the mean price would be below the midpoint of the surplus range.
When buyer and seller status are entered separately (Model 2), no difference emerges in their coefficients -status confers an advantage whether it is granted to buyers or to sellers. The effect of status was slightly stronger when it was randomly allocated than when it was awarded (Model 3). 15 This contradicts Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) who show that an earned advantageous role made subjects more willing to exploit their opponents than a randomly assigned advantageous role.
In Model 4 we substitute an index of answers to the status manipulation questionnaire (the sum of questions 3-6) for the status dummy variable. We allow those with and without stars to have different coefficients on this variable: earnings of higher-status subjects should be (1971) cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model (see pages 618-622). SHAZAM is the statistical package used to estimate the model. 15 But why might the "weaker" status treatment have a stronger average effect on behavior than the "stronger" status treatment? We speculate that this is because of the way in which we wrote the economics quiz. Most educators have experienced the phenomenon that students consider a test to be "fair" if they can do well on it rather than using the criterion that it was an equal test of all students in the class. Since the economics quiz asks the students questions that expected them not to know the answers to, they likely considered the test to be unfair. This may have been compounded by the fact that at least some of the subjects were told (in response to their questions) that no prior knowledge of economics was required for participation in the experiment. The status, having been awarded based on a seemingly meaningful but unfair criterion was thus diminished relative to the random status treatment which was meaningless but fair.
enhanced by a stronger perception of the manipulation, while those of lower-status subjects should be reduced. The variables carry the expected signs, though the coefficient is significant only for those with stars.
In Model 5 we include socioeconomic variables; none has a significant effect on the outcome. This is not surprising, since the competitive design of the market tends to minimize individual effects. In the context of the box-design market, individual differences in behavior are not likely to have much impact on the overall market price. Trades occur in a very tight range of prices within any given period, reducing the variability in earnings across subjects within a session. To detect the effect of individual differences requires experiments with a common type on a given side of the market.
Given our result, we were curious to know whether a naturally-occurring status difference might have a similar effect, and decided to test our setup with women and men as traders. If men are perceived as having higher status, this should increase their earnings relative to women. 16 In order to test for differences in behavior by women and men, therefore, we conducted two paired sessions with men on one side of the market facing women on the other.
Twenty-four additional subjects were recruited from introductory social science classes at Virginia Tech. No status manipulation was used; subjects were simply seated with men on one side of the room and women on the other, without comment. The results of these sessions are shown in Table 4a and b. Men earned 6 percentage points more of the surplus than women overall, and 26 percentage points more in the last five periods of the sessions. This difference is within the range observed in the status sessions. By the last five periods, the price in the market with male sellers exceeded the price in the market with female sellers by a substantial margin.
This difference occurred despite the fact that the men made significantly more bids and asks than women throughout the sessions. (We discovered in pilot experiments that increased activity generally decreases the share of surplus accruing to that side of the market, as buyers--or sellers--bid against each other.) Results of the exit questionnaire are shown in Table 4b . Women rated themselves as significantly less clever and powerful, equally aggressive, and somewhat more deserving than men. Women rated men as more clever and powerful (though less aggressive and deserving) than the men did themselves. This result lends further support to the hypothesis that higher-status participants have higher earnings.
V. Discussion
Our results show that in a competitive market environment, status can have an effect on price and the allocation of resources. That a status treatment that is so obviously superficial could have such an effect on behavior strengthens our belief that status plays an important role in real-world economic interactions. Our results indicate a surprisingly robust effect for the status treatment. An observer of the auction would not detect a difference in the behavior of the subjects: they compete vigorously on both sides of the market, as in a typical oral double auction.
However, the higher-status side of the market appears to be marginally more "stubborn" than the lower-status side, and lower-status players are marginally more willing to defer to the higherstatus players. This impression is bolstered by the fact that we are unable to find a significant difference in the average number of bids and offers per trade in the two treatments. The result of interaction between buyers and sellers of different status is a lower price when buyers have higher status than when sellers have higher status. This result supports the predictions of the example in section 3. Our status results hold up even when we weaken the status treatment by assigning status in an obviously random and meaningless way.
These findings suggest that higher-status persons have greater access to resources, and that it is reasonable to invest resources in order to acquire higher status. In equilibrium the prices paid for high status should just equal participants' discounted ex-ante estimates of the value of status. This type of direct purchase of status was observed several hundred years ago, when wealthy French citizens purchased nobility titles to increase their status levels. In today's markets it explains why products associated with holding high status command a premium over other items. The value of status drives the advertising industry to employ celebrity endorsements, so that consumers will perceive a good as a signal of higher status. It causes the same house to command a higher price in a high-status neighborhood, workers to forego earnings for rank in the workplace, and ordinary citizens to pay high prices for items that once belonged to celebrities. *M-F is significant at p<.1 **M-F is significant at p<.05 ***M-F is significant at p<.001 
